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Can the Chinese trade surplus be reduced through  




This paper shows empirically that China’s trade balance is sensitive to fluctuations in the 
real effective exchange rate of the renminbi, although the size of the surplus is such that 
exchange rate policy alone will be unable to address the imbalance. One of the main rea-
sons why the reduction in the trade surplus is limited is that Chinese imports are reduced 
with a real appreciation of the renminbi. By estimating bilateral import equations, we find 
that it is imports from other Southeast Asian countries which fall. This result reflects the 
vertical integration of Southeast Asia with China through the 'Asian production network'. 
We find, in turn, that imports from Germany – which serve China’s domestic demand – 
behave as one would expect, ie they increase with renminbi real appreciation. All in all, 
our results raise concerns on the impact of renminbi appreciation on Southeast Asia even if 
regional currencies do not follow the renminbi’s upward trajectory. 
 
Keywords: China, trade, exports, real exchange rate 
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Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että muutokset Kiinan valuuttakurssissa vaikuttavat merkittä-
västi maan ulkomaankauppaan. Kauppataseen suurta ylijäämää ei kuitenkaan pystytä pois-
tamaan yksistään valuuttakurssipolitiikalla, sillä reaalisen efektiivisen valuuttakurssin vah-
vistuminen supistaa paitsi Kiinan vientiä myös sen tuontia. Tutkimuksessa vertaillaan Kii-
nan ulkomaankauppaa erityyppisten maiden kanssa kahdenvälisten kauppayhtälöiden avul-
la. Vertailu osoittaa, että Kiinan valuutan vahvistuminen vaikuttaa eri maista Kiinaan suun-
tautuvaan tuontiin eri tavoin. Valuutan vahvistuminen vähentää tuontia niistä Aasian mais-
ta, jotka toimittavat Kiinan jatkojalostussektorille osia ja komponentteja, kun taas tuonti 
Saksasta palvelee suurelta osin Kiinan kotimaista kysyntää ja hyötyy renminbin vahvistu-
misesta. Kaiken kaikkiaan tulokset nostavat esiin kysymyksen, miten renminbin mahdolli-
nen vahvistuminen vaikuttaisi laajemmin Aasian maiden talouskehitykseen.  
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1  Introduction 
 
China’s share of world trade has grown extremely quickly in recent years. China is already 
the world's third largest exporter and might even outpace the United States in the near fu-
ture if such fast export growth is maintained. 
China’s trade was very much in balance until recently. According to China's cus-
toms statistics, the trade surplus amounted to a mere 32 billion US dollars (or 1.7% of 
GDP) in 2004 (Chart 1). However, since 2005 the trade surplus has ballooned, and it 
reached nearly 180 billion US dollars in 2006, or close to 7% of China’s GDP.
4 
 


























Sources: China’s customs statistics, CEIC. 
 
The large size of the surplus makes the issue important not only for China but also for the 
rest of the world. China’s rapidly growing surplus has been much debated in international 
policy fora. On one hand, there is the impression that Chinese policymakers are maintain-
ing an overly depreciated exchange rate so as to profit from external demand and achieve a 
much-needed high growth rate. On the other hand, there are doubts that the exchange rate 
can be an effective tool in reducing the trade surplus, given that China is an economy in 
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transition where prices may still play a smaller role in companies’ decisions concerning 
supply and demand. 
Notwithstanding the general interest in the issue, the existing literature on this topic 
is relatively scarce. The lack of appropriate data and long time-series has discouraged re-
search on exploring the link between the renminbi exchange rate and foreign trade in China 
until very recently. Since the summer of 2003, when discussions on renminbi undervalua-
tion came to the fore, research on China’s exchange rate policy has blossomed. Much of it 
has focused on estimating the long-run equilibrium exchange rate or exploring what ex-
change rate regime best suits China’s economy. While both questions are clearly relevant, 
we feel that the most urgent issue – particularly given the size of global imbalances and the 
pressure applied by industrial countries – is whether China should let its currency appreci-
ate as a tool to reduce its huge trade surplus. The answer very much depends on how effec-
tive renminbi appreciation can be in terms of reducing exports and fostering imports. 
Our paper analyses this question empirically using cointegration analysis. Accord-
ing to our results, China’s trade surplus would shrink following a real appreciation of the 
renminbi, but the reduction would be limited. The relatively small impact – for the size of 
the imbalance – is mainly explained by the peculiar price elasticity we find for imports: 
namely, Chinese imports appear to fall following a real appreciation. By estimating bilat-
eral import equations, we find that it is imports from other Asian countries which fall, 
while those of some industrial countries (Germany in particular) increase. This might be 
explained by the vertical integration of Southeast Asia and China’s key role in the region's 
production network. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the set up and the data used. Section 4 explains the methodology. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results on export and import equations as well as the re-






                                                                                                                                                    
4 China's balance of payments trade statistics generally show slightly larger trade surpluses than the customs 
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2  Literature review 
 
The existing literature on the impact on China’s trade balance of a real appreciation of the 
renminbi can be divided into two groups according to the policy implications. The first– 
and larger – strand shows evidence that a real exchange appreciation reduces the trade bal-
ance, either through exports, imports or both. The second strand either finds no significant 
impact on the trade account or even a positive one. 
Within the first strand, Cerra and Dayal-Gulati (1999) use an error correction model 
to estimate the price elasticities of China's exports and imports for the period 1983–1997 
and find them to be negative and significant for exports (-0.3) and positive and significant 
for imports (0.7). In addition, they show that both elasticities increase over time. Table 1 
summarizes the existing literature as well as the methodology used. 
Dees (2001) improves on the previous analysis by separating China’s exports and 
imports into two categories, those processed and the remainder. He finds that, in the long 
term, exchange rate appreciation decreases exports. He also reports that ordinary exports 
are more price sensitive than processed exports. In the short term, however, only world 
demand influences exports. 
In the same vein, Yue and Hua (2002) use provincial annual data and show a reduc-
tion in exports with a real exchange appreciation. As Cerra and Dayal-Gulati, but with 
more recent data, Yue and Hua show that Chinese exports are becoming more price-
sensitive. 
Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-Révil (2003) simulate the impact of a 10% renminbi 
real depreciation and report an increase in China's exports to OECD countries and a reduc-
tion in China's imports from emerging Asia, provided other regional exchange rates remain 
unchanged. 
Eckaus (2004) uses aggregate annual data for 1985–2002 to discover that the ap-
preciation of the renminbi decreases China's exports to the United States and the share of 
Chinese imports in total US imports. The latter would point to a substitution effect from 
other exporters to the United States, but the result must be treated with care due to the 
small number of observations and the use of export and import values instead of volumes. 
Lau, Mo and Li (2004) estimate China’s exports to and imports from the G3. In the 
long run, an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate is found significant in lower-
ing exports. In contrast, neither ordinary imports nor imports for processing seem to be af-Alicia Garcίa-Herrero and Tuuli Koivu 
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fected by the REER. In any event, the results are difficult to interpret since it is not clear 
how they discount exports and imports, and the number of observations is very low (quar-
terly data from 1995 until 2003). 
Thorbecke (2006) uses a gravity model to study the effect of exchange rate changes 
on triangular trading patterns in Asia and disaggregates exports into intermediate, capital 
and final goods. His results indicate that a 10% renminbi appreciation reduces Chinese fi-
nal exports by nearly 13%. However, the appreciation would not significantly affect Chi-
nese imports from the United States. 
Voon, Guangzhong and Ran (2006), in turn, use sectoral data for the period 1978 to 
1998 and incorporate the degree of overvaluation of the renminbi when estimating China’s 
export equations; they report a fall in exports to the United States as a consequence of real 
exchange rate appreciation. 
Finally, Shu and Yip (2006) estimate the impact of exchange rate movements on 
the Chinese economy as a whole and find that currency appreciation can reduce exports 
due to an expenditure-switching effect, resulting in a moderate contraction in aggregate 
demand. 
Surprisingly, other papers offer a somewhat different view on how exchange rate 
policy may affect China’s trade surplus. In particular, Kamada and Takagawa (2005) use a 
simulation model to estimate the effects of China's exchange rate reform and show that a 
10% revaluation would boost Chinese imports slightly, while the impact on exports would 
be tiny. However, their OLS estimations on China's import equation do not show the real 
exchange rate having a significant effect on the volume of imports. Unfortunately, they do 
not estimate China's export equation. According to their results, exports boost imports, 
which may indicate that there could be an indirect impact from the exchange rate on im-
ports via exports. 
Jin (2003) estimates the relationship between real interest rates, real exchange rates 
and China’s balance of payments and concludes that a real appreciation tends to increase 
the balance of payments surplus. 
Finally, Cerra and Saxena (2003) use sectoral data to study the behaviour of Chi-
nese exporters and find that renminbi appreciation has actually boosted exports, particu-
larly in recent years. In any event, their results – as any other with sectoral data – should be 
treated with care, since only about half of Chinese exports are covered in the sectoral data 
and no quality adjustment is reported for their unit price data. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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The most recent attempt to estimate import and export equations for China is that of 
Marquez and Schindler (2006). Instead of import and export volumes, they estimate the 
impact of real exchange rate changes on China's share of total world trade. This is to avoid 
employing proxies for China’s export and import prices. As Dees (2001) and Lau Mo and 
Li (2004), they break down exports and imports into two groups: ordinary and processing 
trade. Again, real appreciation of the renminbi seems to lower exports but also imports, at 
least for ordinary trade. While interesting, the results are not robust to different lags, par-
ticularly for processed imports and exports. There are two additional problems in using 
their analysis for the question we are seeking to answer. In the first place, estimated im-
pacts are on import and export shares, so no inference can be drawn regarding the trade 
account. Secondly, no cointegration techniques are used, so that only short-run elasticities 
can be estimated. 
All in all, the existing results are either old, relatively faulty in terms of data and 
econometric methodology and/or can hardly be used to infer policy conclusions regarding 
the impact of a renminbi revaluation on China’s trade balance. In this paper, we use more 
recent data and improve the empirical methodology so as to better assess whether a real 
appreciation of the renminbi could reduce China’s trade surplus. In addition, we enrich our 
analysis by estimating bilateral export and import equations. This helps us to crosscheck 
our results as well as to explore which trading partners would benefit and which lose from 
a renminbi appreciation. As we shall show later, such an exercise is particularly relevant in 
the case of China, given its peculiar trade structure. 
 
 
3  Set up and data 
 
To determine the sensitivity of Chinese exports and imports to changes in the renminbi's 
real exchange rate, we estimate the price elasticity of import and export volumes. 
 





t i t t t controls Y REER X ε α α α α + + + + = ∑
=3
*
2 1 0  
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t i t t t controls Y REER M ε β β β β + + + + = ∑
=3
2 1 0  
 
where  t X  stands for the volume of exports from China,  t M  for the volume of im-
ports into China,  t REER  for the real effective exchange rate of the renminbi, 
*
t Y  for for-
eign demand and  t Y  for China’s domestic demand. Therefore,  1 α  is the price elasticity of 
exports,  2 α  is the income elasticity of exports,  1 β  is the price elasticity of imports and  2 β  
is the income elasticity of imports. 
Given the importance of processing for China’s trade, we distinguish between im-
ports used for processing goods to be re-exported and ordinary imports. In the same way, 
we differentiate between processed and ordinary exports. Processing trade comprises im-
ports of components for assembly into exportables, exports of components for assembly 
outside China and exports of goods assembled using imported components. Ordinary trade, 
in turn, refers to goods which are not subject to further processing and not assembled from 
imported components. Processing trade accounts for about half of China’s trade. Charts 1 
and 2 in the Appendix show the trend in ordinary and processed exports and imports: both 
grew much faster from 2001 onwards, in conjunction with China’s WTO entry. 
An important difficulty in working with Chinese trade data is that export or import 
values and volumes cannot be disentangled, as no export and import price indices exist. 
We therefore need to use proxies. For import prices we calculate the index of China’s 
twenty-five most important trade partners' export prices and deflate China’s imports with 
this index (data sources can be found in Table 1 in the Appendix). As a proxy for export 
prices, we use China’s consumer price index (CPI). The reason why we take such a general 
price measure is that neither a producer price index nor a wholesale price index exists for 
our whole sample. In any event, as a robustness test, Hong Kong’s export prices into China 
are used as proxy for China’s export prices and the results are maintained.
5 
The real effective exchange rate (REER) is drawn from the IMF's international fi-








∏ =  
                                                 
5 The underlying assumption is that most of Hong Kong's exports are Chinese products and that Hong Kong’s 
mark-up of these goods remains relatively constant. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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where N stands for the number of currencies included in the index,  i w  is the weight 
of the i
th currency and  t i rer ,  is the bilateral real exchange rate against each of China’s trad-
ing partners.
6 As shown in Chart 3 in the Appendix, the REER experienced a very steep 
appreciation from 1994 until 1997 and then tended to fall until very recently. The question 
is whether – and to which extent – the sharp increase in exports can be explained by such 
real depreciation. 
From the theoretical literature, we expect the price elasticity for exports to be nega-
tive, as Chinese products compete in the world market. The expected sign for the price 
elasticity of imports is less clear, at least in the Chinese case. A real appreciation should 
foster imports if the gained purchasing power is stronger than the reduced demand due to 
the associated fall in exports. Which effect is stronger will very much depend on the import 
structure. In fact, if imports are substitutes for Chinese products, the price elasticity should 
be positive (ie an appreciation should increase imports). In turn, imported parts and com-
ponents for the export industry may be affected negatively by a renminbi appreciation if 
the latter reduces exports. 
Foreign demand is measured by world imports and deflated by the global import 
price index. For China’s domestic demand we take industrial production, deflated by the 
CPI. Industrial production is preferred to GDP because it is available at a monthly fre-
quency. The expected sign for the income elasticity is positive for both exports and im-
ports. 
We choose a few additional controls that could be relevant to the Chinese case. 
Firstly, value-added tax rebates offered to exporting companies are included in the export 
equation since they should foster exports. In the same vein, import tariffs are an additional 
regressor in the import equation. These have been reduced at a very fast pace since WTO 
entry, coinciding with the surge in imports. 
Secondly, on the supply side, we introduce a third variable in the export equation: a 
measure of capacity utilization. This should help take into account supply constraints that 
could hinder export growth. Capacity utilization is defined as the difference between in-
dustrial production and its trend, the latter being calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
Thirdly, the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI), deflated by the CPI, is intro-
duced to both the export and the import equations. In principle, a rise in FDI should in-
                                                 
6 For more details, see Bayoumi et al. (2005). Alicia Garcίa-Herrero and Tuuli Koivu 
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crease China's exports in as far as FDI is geared towards the export industry. We also ex-
pect a positive coefficient for imports, since foreign companies are more likely to use im-
ported machines, components and parts in their production than Chinese companies. It 
should be noted, though, that FDI data is only available from 1997 onwards, which creates 
problems for finding a cointegrating vector other than by shortening our sample. This is 
why FDI will in the end only appear in one of the estimated equations, namely that for or-
dinary imports. 
Finally, a deterministic trend is included in both export and import equations when 
it is statistically significant. The trend variable should help capture productivity improve-
ments and the on-going reforms in the Chinese economy, which we cannot easily measure 
otherwise. 
We use monthly deseasonalized data for the period 1994–2005. While aware that 
our research period is rather short, it would make little sense to start before 1994, as China 
was at that time basically a planned economy.
7 In fact, 1994 was a very productive year in 
terms of reforms towards a more market-oriented economy. Some of them are especially 
relevant to the question we have posed ourselves. Namely, the two exchange rate systems 
were unified, mandatory planning for imports was eliminated and licensing requirements 
and quotas were reduced. Moreover, the renminbi started to be convertible on the current 
account, while private sector development benefited from the new company law. 
The continuous move towards a market economy allowed China to enter the WTO 
in December 2001. Due to the many years of preparation for accession and the transition 
period after membership, it is very difficult to estimate when, and how much, China’s 
WTO membership has affected Chinese exports and imports. However, we test if China’s 
foreign trade has become more price sensitive with the reforms by dividing our sample into 
two periods: from 1994 to the end of 1999 and from the beginning of 2000 (when WTO 
membership essentially became certain) to the end of 2005. In addition, we do find a struc-
tural break in 2000 for exports and imports
8, which supports our strategy. 
 
 
                                                 
7 According to the OECD Economic Survey (2005), the share of transactions conducted at market prices 
among producer goods increased to 78% in 1995, from 46% in 1991. At the same time, the share of prices 
fixed by the state dropped from 36% to 16%. 
8 The exception is ordinary exports, for which the structural break was found in 1998. However, the same 
year is chosen to separate the two periods for the sake of homogeneity. 
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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4  Methodology 
 
We use cointegration techniques to estimate the price elasticity of imports and exports in 
China. This is because several of the variables of interest, in particular export and import 
volumes, are found to be non-stationary. Furthermore, such methodology allows us to 
separate between short-run and long-run elasticities. We are clearly more interested in the 
latter, since we would like to determine how permanent could be the effect on the trade ac-
count of a real appreciation of the renminbi. 
We use a reduced form for export and import equations for both processed and non-
processed goods. A reduced form equation is preferred to avoid simultaneous equation bias 
which would result from estimating supply and demand functions alone. However, to avoid 
potential problems with omitted variables, we include supply and demand determinants in 
the reduced form equation. 
We first test the order of integration of the variables included in our analysis. We 
use Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests for the existence of a unit root (Table 3 in the 
Appendix). Most of the variables are found to be non-stationary in levels but stationary in 
first differences. There are a few exceptions, however: capacity utilization, which appears 
to be I(0), and domestic demand and FDI into China, which are not stationary even in first 
differences. However, the latter result might be due to the relatively large number of lags 
suggested by the Akaike information criteria. If we have only one lag, as suggested by the 
Schwarz criterion, we can reject the unit root in both cases even at a 1% level. 
As a second step, we test for the existence of cointegration vectors using the 
Johansen procedure. We do find one cointegrating vector for all groups of variables tested 
(Table 4 in the Appendix).
9 The finding of a cointegrating vector for each type of export 
and import allows us to estimate a regression of the lagged determinants and their differ-
ences through a non-linear least square approach, as proposed by Phillips and Loretan 
(1991).
10 Such an approach will yield unbiased and consistent estimates of the parameters 
to be estimated. 
 
 
                                                 
9 When FDI is included, two or more cointegrating vectors are found, except in the case of ordinary imports. 
When FDI is introduced as a short-run determinant of exports and imports, it is not found to be significant. 
Results are available upon request. Alicia Garcίa-Herrero and Tuuli Koivu 
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5  Results 
 
We ran regressions on export and import equations for our full sample, ie 1994–2005, and 
for the shorter one, from 2000 onwards.
11 In both cases, we distinguish between processed 
and ordinary trade. 
The results for the export equations can be found in Table 2. Long-run price elastic-
ities of China’s exports – both processed and ordinary – are negative and significant in our 
full sample and also since WTO entry. When appropriately transformed (see Table 4), the 
long-run elasticities are -1.3 for processed exports and -1.8 for ordinary exports for the full 
sample and only slightly lower for the shorter time frame (-1.6 and -1.2, respectively). Our 
results are very close to previous long-run estimates for China (-1.5 for total exports ac-
cording to Lau, Mo and Li, 2004 and -1.3 for Shu and Yip, 2006). They are also similar to 
the estimated export price elasticities for major industrial countries (-1.5 and -1.6 for the 
United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, according to Hooper et al., 1998). In 
addition, the short-run elasticities are found significant for several of the lagged variables. 
                                                                                                                                                    
10 This approach tackles the simultaneity problem by including lagged values of the stationary deviation from 
the cointegrating relationship. 
11 As a preliminary step, we use Chow tests to assess whether there is a structural break in our series. We do 
find one in the year 2000 for both exports and imports. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 6/2007 
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Table 2   China's export equations 
   Dependent variable 
   Full sample  From WTO onwards 
 
D_ordinary exports  D_processed exports  D_ordinary ex-
ports 
D_processed exports 
LR coefficients             
C 2.759  2.936**  5.308***  3.006** 
   (1.764)  (1.476)  (1.821)  (1.500) 
world importst-1 0.025  0.010  0.651***  0.896*** 
   (.215)  (.169)  (.214)  (.206) 
REERt-1 -0.385**  -0.330***  -1.334***  -1.112*** 
   (.163)  (.122)  (.225)  (.215) 
ordinary exportst-1  -0.213***     -0.811***    
   (.058)     (.122)    
processed exportst-1     -0.258***     -0.934*** 
      (.069)     (.146) 
trend 0.003***  0.004***  0.009***  0.011** 
   (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.002) 
dummy 02/04        -0.238***    
         (.047)    
dummy 01/03          0.114*** 
            (.031) 
SR coefficients            
D_world importst 0.224  0.702***  0.502***  0.831*** 
   (.288)  (.229)  (.186)  (.150) 
D_world importst-1 0.375  0.422 -0.070  -0.006 
   (.389)  (.314)  (.194)  (.168) 
D_world importst-2 0.057  0.072      
   (.360)  (.288)      
D_world importst-3 0.306  0.009      
   (.277)  (.221)      
D_REERt -0.697  -0.483  -0.995**  -0.823** 
   (.512)  (.410)  (.430)  (.344) 
D_REERt-1 1.080**  0.773*  1.552***  1.080** 
   (.534)  (.432)  (.454)  (.377) 
D_REERt-2  -0.494  -0.815*       
   (.547)  (.438)       
D_REERt-3  0.716  0.627       
   (.540)  (.434)       
D_capacity utilizationt 0.524***  0.578*** 0.796***  0.634*** 
   (.186)  (.148)  (.151)  (.107) 
D_capacity utilizationt-1 0.528**  0.035  0.538***  0.273* 
   (.232)  (.185)  (.140)  (.144) 
D_capacity utilizationt-2 0.109  -0.045      0.124 
   (.230)  (.178)     (.113) 
D_capacity utilizationt-3  0.083  0.038       
   (.194)  (.150)       
D_ordinary exportst-1  -0.338***     0.003    
   (.082)     (.099)    
D_processed exportst-1     -0.229**     0.068 
      (.089)     (0.104) 
Sample period  1/1995-12/2005  1/1995-12/2005  1/2000-12/2005  1/2000-12/2005 
Number of obs.  132  132  72  72 
R
2 adjusted  .33  .47  .64  .78 
Standard errors in parentheses. * Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. Alicia Garcίa-Herrero and Tuuli Koivu 
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The long-run positive effect on Chinese exports from the increase in world demand is very 
small and not statistically significant in our full sample, but it does become highly signifi-
cant after WTO membership for both ordinary and processed exports. This result is in line 
with the idea that China was facing enormous barriers to profiting from other countries’ 
growth before WTO entry. For the most recent sample, the income elasticity of Chinese 
exports is very close to 1, as one would expect (0.8 for ordinary exports and 1 for proc-
essed ones).
12 
As for the control variables, capacity utilization is found significant and with the 
expected sign. Namely, higher capacity utilization – which should go hand in hand with a 
larger supply of goods – raises exports. This is true in both sample periods and is even 
more persistent for ordinary exports. 
The results for imports are shown in Table 3. Interestingly, the price elasticity of 
imports is negative and generally significant. In other words, a renminbi real appreciation 
tends to reduce imports rather than to increase them. This is the case with imports for proc-
essing (at least in the most recent sample) and ordinary imports and is in line with the re-
sults of Marquez and Schindler (2006). Such negative price elasticity implies that imports 
are more sensitive to lower external demand induced by real appreciation of the renminbi 
than to a rise in purchasing power. Such a result probably reflects the vertical integration 
which characterizes trade links in Southeast Asia and the key role that China plays therein. 
The long-run income elasticity is found significant only in the case of imports for 
processing and with a relatively low coefficient (0.5).
13 In other words, China’s domestic 
demand does not seem very relevant in explaining the growing trend of Chinese’ imports. 
Again, this is in line with the idea that external demand is a major determinant of Chinese 
imports. 
The stock of FDI appears to have a long-run positive effect on ordinary imports. 
The lack of a single cointegrating vector for processed exports or any kind of imports does 
not allow us to draw conclusions on how they are affected by FDI. 
                                                 
12 We notice that this result is closely linked to the trend variable in the regression. If we exclude trend from 
the export regressions, an increase in world demand significantly increases Chinese exports. The introduction 
of the trend is justified by its statistical significance and the results from misspecification tests. 
13 In the case of ordinary imports, the income elasticity becomes positive and significant for 1994–2005 if we 
omit the trend variable from the regression. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Finally, for the full sample we also find a significant impact of import tariffs in the 
long-run. For imports for processing, the coefficient is negative, as one would expect, but it 
is positive for ordinary imports.
14 
Table 3  China's import equations 
   Dependent variable 
   Full sample  From WTO onwards 
   D_ordinary imports 
D_imports for 
processing D_ordinary  imports 
D_ imports for 
processing 
LR coefficients             
c 4.844*  0.677  -1.291  5.110*** 
   (2.546)  (.977)  (1.718)  (1.814) 
domestic demandt-1 -0.095  0.228***  0.015  0.033 
   (.145)  (.074)  (.094)  (.161) 
REERt-1 -0.754*  0.067  -0.624**  -0.605** 
   (.390)  (.145)  (.249)  (.270) 
import tariffst-1 0.238**  -0.094*      -0.087 
   (.111)  (.057)     (.096) 
fdit-1       0.622***    
        (.220)    
ordinary importst-1 -0.543***    -0.464***     
   (.109)    (.099)    
imports for processingt-1     -0.440***     -0.669*** 
      (.100)     (.158) 
trend 0.012***  0.003***      0.008*** 
   (.003)  (.004)     (.003) 
dummy 01/2003       0.237***    
         (.055)    
SR coefficients             
D_domestic demandt 1.133***  1.158***  0.866***  1.155*** 
   (.325)  (.135)  (.188)  (.156) 
D_domestic demandt-1 0.387  0.284      0.440** 
   (.381)  (.176)     (.217) 
D_domestic demandt-2 -0.092  -0.059       
   (.326)  (.172)      
D_domestic demandt-3     0.024      
      (.154)      
D_domestic demandt-4     0.118      
      (.128)      
D_REERt 0.296  -0.192  -0.992 -0.979** 
   (.934)  (.363)  (.625)  (.481) 
D_REERt-1 -1.048  1.213**  1.536** 1.763*** 
   (.934)  (.382)  (.685)  (.526) 
D_REERt-2     -0.998***    -0.622 
      (.384)    (.495) 
D_fdit        0.152    
         (1.940)    
D_fdit-1        2.275    
         (1.746)    
D_fdit-2        -3.632**    
         (1.560)    
D_fdit-3        -3.328**    
         (1.557)    
D_ordinary importst-1  -0.334***     -0.188**    
   (.087)     (.086)    
D_imports for processingt-1     -0.149**     -0.055 
      (0.073)     (.123) 
Sample period  12/1994-12/2005  2/1995-12/2005  1/2000-12/2005  1/2000-12/2005 
Number of obs.  133  131  72  72 
R
2 adjusted  .50  .63  .69  .74 
Standard errors in parentheses. * Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level.  
                                                 
14 Import tariffs could not be included as a short-run variable because we only had annual data on tariffs and 
thus changes were rare throughout the sample. Alicia Garcίa-Herrero and Tuuli Koivu 
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Table 4. Long-run price and income elasticities 









Price elasticity  1994–2005  -1.8 -1.3 -1.4 (0.15) 
   2000–2005  -1.6 -1.2 -1.4 -0.9 
Income elasticity  1994–2005  (0.1) (0.1) (-0.2)  0.5 
   2000–2005  0.8 1.0 (0.0)  (0.0) 
Values in parentheses are not statistically significant.     
 
 
In order to have a rough idea of how effective the exchange rate tool can be in China, we 
assume a 10% real appreciation of the renminbi and apply the price elasticities estimated 
for export and imports since WTO entry was known. On that basis – which is obviously a 
very simple exercise – exports would have fallen 14% and imports 12% in 2005. All in all, 
the trade surplus would have been reduced by 26% with a 10% renminbi real appreciation. 
To have a better understanding of the results, particularly the reasons for the reduc-
tion in imports after a real appreciation, we now focus on bilateral trade. If a real apprecia-
tion causes a reduction in imports from all of China's main trade partners, we could argue 
that an appreciation reduces demand in China due to the associated fall in exports. But if 
we found that countries' exports to China react to an appreciation in different ways, it 
would indicate that there is a differential impact of a real appreciation of the renminbi 
across countries depending on the composition of their exports to China. 
The reason why we expect the latter to be the case is China’s key role in the Asian 
production chain, with increasing imports of components from other Southeast Asian coun-
tries, which are then transformed and re-exported to the rest of the world. Such vertical in-
tegration implies that exports from Southeast Asian countries are becoming complements 
rather than substitutes so that they can be negatively affected by a fall in external demand 
for them, particularly if it is the final exporter, as in the case of China. 
The large differences in China’s bilateral trade balances across countries reflect the 
peculiar nature of Chinese trade: while China is in deficit or close to balance with most 
Asian countries, it has very large surpluses with most European countries and even more 
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Source: Direction of trade sStatistics. 
 
 
To estimate bilateral price elasticities for exports and imports, we calculate the bilateral 
real exchange rate between the renminbi and the currency of each of China’s ten largest 
export and import partners.
15 As in the previous exercise, the CPI is used as a deflator. Im-
ports from other countries to China are converted into volumes by using their export price 
indices. For Chinese bilateral exports, in contrast, the CPI is the best deflator one can ob-
tain. The demand for China's exports is proxied by GDP growth in each of its export part-
ners. We also introduce the stock of bilateral FDI as a control variable. 
Following the same procedure as for the aggregate export and import equations, we 
conduct unit root tests for all bilateral variables. Most of them are I(1). In addition, one 
cointegration vector was found for each bilateral import and export equation. Again, we 




                                                 
15 In formulating the bilateral equations, we do not use China's trade data but the trade partners' statistics to 
alleviate the incorrect account of China’s trade with Hong Kong. China’s statistics show a large amount of 
exports to Hong Kong, which in reality only transit via Hong Kong to other countries. In any event, the data 
we use has other well-known caveats. For example, due to reasons of taxation and its large ports, the Nether-
lands is often signed as a final destiny although the goods might continue on to other European countries. 
This explains the significance of the Netherlands as one of China's major trade partners and also its large 
trade deficit with China. In reality, the bilateral equation on the trade between China and the Netherlands 
reflects the dynamics of trade between China and Europe more generally. 
16 All reported equations pass tests for serial correlation and normal distribution of residuals. Alicia Garcίa-Herrero and Tuuli Koivu 
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The results for the largest export countries are very similar across countries and, 
therefore, also in our aggregate estimations.
17 The appreciation of the renminbi real ex-
change rate against that of each of China’s major partners reduces Chinese exports. The 
long-run coefficients are significant for all major destinations except Hong Kong, which is 
not surprising given the difficult interpretation of trade data between China and Hong 
Kong. After transformation (see Table 7), the export price elasticity appears to be highest 
for exports to the United States – nearly 5. 
We also find that economic activity in China’s partners increases China's exports, 
as one would expect. Bilateral income elasticities are very significant for all countries ex-
cept Japan. Furthermore, they are extremely high for some countries, particularly the 
United States. This result shows the importance of demand factors in explaining the grow-
ing trade imbalance between the United States and China. 
In many cases, our measure of productivity gains, the trend variable, is also positive 
and significant. When possible, we include Chinese inward FDI from each of these destiny 
countries. FDI into China from the United States seems to foster Chinese exports to the 
United States. The opposite is true for Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. 
Results for bilateral import equations are much less homogenous, as shown in Ta-
ble 6.
18 First, our estimated long-run price elasticities show that a real appreciation of the 
renminbi reduces Asian countries’ exports to China (except for Malaysia). The coefficient 
is significant for Korea and Thailand, although not very large (Table 7). In turn, the long-
run price elasticity for German exports to China is positive and highly significant. Finally, 
such long-run price elasticities are not significant for the United States, among other coun-
tries.
19 
As for income elasticities, they are positive and significant for US exports to China, 
and for those of Germany, Japan and Korea, but not for emerging Asian countries, such as 
Malaysia, Taiwan or Thailand, or even Australia. All in all, our results support the view 
that it is China’s domestic demand that is driving imports from major industrial countries, 
and it is demand for Chinese exports that is driving imports from emerging Asia. 
                                                 
17 We do not report the equation on China's exports to Italy and Taiwan as they do not pass the standard tests 
mentioned in footnote 9. 
18 Out of China's ten most important import sources, we drop Singapore due to econometric problems and 
Russia due to the lack of reliable export prices. 
19 When we estimated China's bilateral import equation with the euro area excluding Germany, the price elas-
ticity was positive and significant but the regression had problems in passing the LM test for residuals' serial 
correlation. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 7 shows the transformed long-run price and income elasticities for China’s 
bilateral export and import equations. Both price and income elasticities are higher for 
China's exports than for China's imports, which explains the growing trade surplus. For 
most countries, price elasticities are close to those estimated for China’s aggregate exports 
and imports. The very high demand elasticities of Chinese exports to some countries are 
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  US HK  Japan  Germany  Korea  Netherlands  UK  Singapore 
LR coefficients                         
c 
-
66.291*** -2.676  -4.409  -55.852***  -11.487*** -41.379***  -75.340***  -6.851 
   (13.043)  (2.510)  (8.904)  (15.407)  (3.674)  (10.938)  (10.329)  -4.676 
GDP
i
t-1 9.901***  0.745***  0.990  5.076***  1.561*** 6.087***  7.275***  1.680*** 
    (1.884)  (.250) (.762) (1.387) (.368)  (1.520)  (.987) (-0.533) 
RER
i
t-1  -3.875***  -0.129  -0.637*** -0.798***  -0.560***  -0.961***  -0.466*** -1.375* 
    (1.119)  (.284)  (0.138) (.222)  (.143)  (.253)  (0.086) (.743) 
FD
i
t-1  1.404***  -0.177*             -0.299***    
   (.279)  (.103)             (0.047)    
exports
i
t-1  -0.780***  -0.614*** -0.886*** -0.368***  -0.700***  -0.817***  -0.811*** -0.941*** 
   (.112)  (.128)  (.175)  (.094)  (.143)  (.187)  (106)  (.221) 
trend  -0.022***  0.003*  0.009***     0.004***        0.011*** 
   (.005)  (.001)  (.002)     (.001)        (.000) 
dummy*  -0.189***       -0.209***  0.339***     -0.218***    
   (.033)        (.062)  -0.084     (.046)    
SR coefficients                        
D_GDP
i
t 0.788  0.044  0.571  3.549  0.220  -4.021 4.304*  0.951 





10.709*** -0.087  -0.962  0.294  -0.723  -9.267**  -3.790*  0.009 
    (2.038)  (.467) (1.235)  (2.455) -0.806  (3.642)  (1.962)  (.737) 
D_GDP
i
t-2 -7.500***  0.243  0.747  2.408 -0.258  -3.335  -0.764  0.243 
    (1.836)  (.439) (1.173)  (2.452) (.709)  (3.537)  (1.918)  (.675) 
D_GDP
i
t-3  -4.560**        -8.488***       -2.244    
   (1.865)        (2.440)       (2.345)    
D_rer
i
t  -3.748** 0.500  -0.931*** -0.525*  -0.530**  -0.861**  -1.030*** -1.825** 
    (1.492)  (.859) (.205) (.307)  (.203)  (.423)  (.213) (.777) 
D_rer
i
t-1 0.558  -0.274  0.426*  0.370  0.186  0.765 -0.159  1.237 
    (1.512)  (.883) (.218) (.317)  (.253)  (.509)  (.225) (.757) 
D_rer
i-2
t  -1.084  0.921 0.178 0.638* -0.357  0.044  0.345 0.485 
    (1.630)  (.881) (.222) (.330)  (.244)  (.467)  (.223) (.758) 
D_rer
i
t-3     1.466**     0.696*       -0.019  1.171* 
      (.737)     (.306)       (.225)  (.666) 
D_FDI
i
t  1.303  1.080  -0.346 0.554  -0.095  -1.950  -0.364 -1.322 
   (1.530)  (.837)  (1.248)  (.970)  (.923)  (1.341)  -0.489  (2.072) 
D_FDI
i
t-1 0.897  -0.815  0.778  0.880  2.200**  1.789  -0.987*  2.824 
    (1.522)  (.830) (1.221)  (1.044) (.934)  (1.337)  (.500) (2.035) 
D_FDI
i
t-2 -0.642  1.201  2.649*  0.879  0.120  0.035  0.937  0.631 
   (1.564)  (.819) (1.318)  (1.049) (.946)  (1.246)  (.495) (2.029) 
D_FDI
i
t-3           -0.254       0.564    
            (1.003)       (.459)    
D_FDI
i
t-4           -1.958**            
            (.908)            
D_Cutilizationt -0.606***  0.651*** -0.335** -0.195  0.487** -0.057  0.033  0.073 
    (.123)  (.140) (.158) (.210)  (.217)  (.251)  (.122) (.254) 
D_Cutilizationt-1  0.401**  0.502***  0.168 -0.011  0.145  -0.115  0.062 -0.157 
    (.158)  (.161) (.195) -0.274  (.253)  (.295)  (.148) (.298) 
D_Cutilizationt-2 0.126  0.118  -0.080  -0.433  -0.021  -0.047  0.064  -0.397 
    (.151)  (.130) (.188) (.268)  (.215)  (.233)  (.151) (.273) 
D_Cutilizationt-3           0.049       0.022    
            (.213)       (.120)    
D_ exports
i
t-1 -0.001      -0.142  -0.280***  -0.197**  -0.055  0.018  -0.070 
   (.102)     (.121)  (.103)  (.084)  (.138)  (.086)  (.154) 
Sample period  1/01-12/05  4/95-12/05  1/00-12/05  1/99-12/05 4/95-12/05  1/01-12/05 5/95-12/05  1/01-12/05 
Number of obs.  60  129  72  84  129  60  128  60 
R
2  adjusted  .85  .56 .66 .45  .56  .42  .54 .45 
Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
Dummy: United States 10/02, Germany 12/01, Korea 8/96 and United Kingdom 4/99. 
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Table 6 Bilateral import equations 
 
  Dependent variable: imports to China from country i 




lia Malaysia  Thailand 
LR coefficients                        
c  0.260  -1.235**  6.322  -2.372 -0.483 1.365  -5.647 -0.968 
    (.279)  (.523)  (10.746)  (2.661) (.375)  (1.039) (5.590) (.934) 
China's ind. productiont-
1 0.233***  0.182** 0.386**  0.146  0.365*** 0.235 -0.069  0.071 
    (.078)  (.088)  (.157) (.104) (.094) (.163) (.267) (.104) 
rer
i
t-1 -0.023  -0.163*  -1.069  -0.451  0.245*** -0.016 0.150  -0.434** 
    (.080)  (.084)  (1.786)  (.416) (.090) (.144) (.866) (.213) 
FDI
i
t-1 0.066  0.327*** 0.030 0.684     -0.313*  1.467*** 1.098*** 
    -0.043  (.084)  (.384) (.449)     (.166) (.465) (.289) 
China's imports
i
t-1 -0.245***  -0.425*** 
-




0.647*** -0.609 -0.473*** 
    (.076)  (.097)  (.146) (.086) (.082) (.102) (.133) (.097) 
trend               0.009**       
                (.004)       






0.473***       
      (.072)  (.073)  (.146)  (.103)  (.122)       
SR coefficients                       
D_ind.prod
ch
t 0.415***  0.615*** 0.398** 1.200*** 0.109 0.217 0.148    
    (.123)  (.132)  (.187) (.240) (.183) (.214) (.215)    
D_ind.prod
ch
t-1  0.125  0.158  0.454**  -0.463*  0.156 0.129 -0.244     
    (.126)  (.167)  (.189) (.277) (.225) (.209) (.232)    
D_ind.prod
ch
t-2      0.057       0.160          
      (.157)       (.221)          
D_ind.prod
ch
t-3     0.083       0.227          
      (.130)       (.182)          
D_rer
i
t -0.439***  -0.039  6.677**  -0.328 -0.212 0.236  2.040  -0.199 
    (.226)  (.190)  (3.198)  (.853) (.393) (.380) (2.042)  (.575) 
D_rer
i
t-1  0.324  -0.116  0.319  0.652  -0.168 -0.080 -0.834 1.542** 
    (.226)  (.208)  (3.132)  (.842) (.402) (.399) (1.979)  (.594) 
D_rer
i
t-2 0.096  0.055  6.546***  1.578*  -0.274          
   (.222)  (.205)  (2.259)  (.812)  (.401)          
D_rer
i
t-3  -0.376*  0.324*       -0.122          
   (.219)  (.189)       (.384)          
D_FDI
i
t  -0.926  1.724*  0.050  7.166** 2.401** 0.593  1.441  0.683 
    (.856)  (.940)  (3.265)  (2.837)  (.924) (.938) (2.256)  (1.802) 
D_FDI
i
t-1  -0.030  0.402  -6.638**  4.184  -0.617 -0.294 -1.211 -4.474** 
    (.849)  (.929)  ((3.169)  (2.889)  (.992) (.395) (2.339)  (1.179) 
D_FDI
i
t-2     -1.028     -3.252  -0.412          
      (.860)     (2.694)  (.982)          
D_FDI
i
t-3     -0.894     2.746  -1.806*          
      (.814)     (2.756)  (.946)          Alicia Garcίa-Herrero and Tuuli Koivu 
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D_China's imports
i




0.352*** -0.089 -0.041 -0.077 
    (.085)  (.089)  (.108) (.096) (.076) (.086) (.117) (.099) 













Number  of  obs.  130 128 60 96 128  60 82 82 
R
2  adjusted  .27  .48  .61 .60 .43 .42 .31 .36 
Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 




Table 7  Bilateral long-run price and income elasticities 
 
  Export equation    Import equation 
  RER Demand    RER Demand 
US  -5.0 12.7  Japan  (-0.1) 1.0 
Hong Kong  (-0.2) 1.2  Korea  -0.4 0.4 
Japan  -0.7 -1.1  US  (-1.6) 0.6 
Germany  -2.2 13.8  Taiwan  (-2.9) (0.9) 
Korea  -0.8 2.2  Germany  0.6 0.9 
Netherlands  -1.2 7.45  Singapore  - - 
UK  -0.6 9.0  Russia  - - 
Singapore  -1.5 1.8  Australia  (0.0) (0.4) 
Taiwan  - -  Malaysia  (0.2) (-0.1) 
Italy  - -  Thailand  -0.6 (-0.2) 
Values in parentheses are not statistically significant. 
 
 
To better understand the diverse results found for Chinese imports, we examine the com-
position of China’s imports from each of its major trading partners (Table 8). Australia ba-
sically exports energy and raw materials to China, which might explain the lack of signifi-
cance of both price and income elasticities. Germany’s exports to China are mainly ma-
chinery, electronics and cars for domestic demand. These are all products for which a 
competitiveness gain – through a renminbi real appreciation –can help tilt the balance in 
their favour. Although Japan’s export structure to China is very similar to that of Germany, 
its exports are not sensitive to changes in the renminbi-yen real exchange rate, only to 
China’s domestic demand. Such lack of price sensitivity might be explained by the poten-
tial substitutability between Japan’s sizable FDI in China and Japanese exports to China. 
US exports to China, whose price elasticity is not found significant, consist mainly of air-
craft, machinery and semiconductors. These are products for which there are no clear sub-
stitutes in China and, in some cases, not even elsewhere. Finally, imports from Southeast BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 6/2007 
 
  27 
Asia are very concentrated on electronics, which are then re-exported from China. This 
kind of import is, therefore, very dependent on China’s external demand. 
 






products  Chemicals  Textiles 
Base me-
tals  Machinery  Electronics  Vehicles 
Optical 
instruments 
Australia 4.5  52.8  10.2  8.2  12.7  1.9  0.8  1  0.4 
Germany 0.2  0.2  6.9  0.6  7.8  35.9  13.1  11.9  6 
Japan 0.2  1.5  8.8  3.7  11.4  21.5  30.0  4.5  8.7 
Korea 0.6  4.7  10.2  3.8  9.7  9.5  33.6  2.8  14.8 
Malaysia 6.4  2.6  4.1  0.7  1.8  8.6  63.0  0.1  1.3 
Taiwan 0.1  0.9  7.4  4.5  10  9.7  38.7  0.5  16.1 
Thailand 6.1  5.9  4.4  2.6  2.9  27.5  26.5  0.3  1.3 





6  Conclusions 
 
During the past few years, there has been growing discussion both in China and in interna-
tional fora on the desirability of a real appreciation of the renminbi. Many have argued that 
exchange rate policy would not serve the purpose of reducing China’s ballooning trade 
surplus. This paper shows empirically that China’s trade balance is sensitive to fluctuations 
in the real effective exchange rate. In fact, estimating long-run elasticities of Chinese ex-
ports and imports to changes in the renminbi’s real effective exchange rate for the period 
from 1994 to end-2005, we find strong evidence that a real appreciation reduces exports in 
the long-run in quite a substantial way. This is the case for both processed exports (ie 
transformed and re-exported goods) and ordinary exports. However, real exchange appre-
ciation also reduces imports, particularly since 2000, when China’s accession to the WTO 
became certain. This explains why the overall impact of exchange rate policy on the trade 
account is relatively small; a rough estimate would be a 26% reduction for a 10% real ap-
preciation of the renminbi. While the correction of the trade surplus is welcome, this result 
essentially illustrates that exchange rate policy alone cannot solve the growing imbalance 
of the Chinese economy, namely its ballooning trade surplus. Accompanying policies are, 
therefore, needed. 
Given that the limited impact of exchange rate policy hinges on the unusual reac-
tion of imports to appreciation of the renminbi, we explore the issue further by estimating Alicia Garcίa-Herrero and Tuuli Koivu 
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bilateral import equations. Price elasticities for Chinese imports from Southeast Asian 
countries are negative and generally significant (in particular for Korea and Thailand). This 
result may be explained by China’s key role in the Asian production network. Such a net-
work, based on vertical integration, makes products from different Asian countries more of 
a complement than a substitute, so that a fall in China’s external demand because of a real 
appreciation of the renminbi also reduces their exports to China. The positive and signifi-
cant price elasticity found for German exports to China suggests that a real appreciation of 
the renminbi could have a very different impact on China’s trading partners depending on 
the structure of their exports to China. 
These findings raise concerns over Asia’s possible response to a sudden apprecia-
tion of the renminbi. In fact, the negative impact we find on some Southeast economies 
would, in principle, be larger if Asian currencies were to follow the renminbi’s upward tra-
jectory. 
Although this study only concentrates on the trade surplus – so that the conclusions 
cannot be comprehensive – it does serve to note the importance of investigating further po-
tential domino effects from a real appreciation of the Chinese currency and different com-
binations of exchange policies in Asia. 
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Appendix 
Table 1  Data sources 
Variable Explanation  Frequency  Source  Method 
Processed 
exports 
The volume of China's proc-
essed exports   Monthly CEIC 
Original data in USD millions. Converted 




The volume of China's ordi-
nary exports   Monthly CEIC 
Original data in USD millions. Converted 




The volume of China's im-
ports for processing  Monthly  CEIC 
Original data in USD millions. Converted 
to renminbi and deflated by China's import 
price index. Seasonally adjusted. 
Ordinary im-
ports 
The volume of China's ordi-
nary imports   Monthly  CEIC 
Original data in USD millions. Converted 
to renminbi and deflated by China's import 
price index. Seasonally adjusted. 
China's bilate-
ral exports  
The volume of China's bilat-
eral exports  Monthly 
Direction of 
trade, CEIC 
Data from China's trade partners' side. 
Original data in USD was converted to 




The volume of China's bilat-
eral imports  Monthly 
Direction of 
trade, CEIC 
Data from China's trade partners' side. 
Original data in USD was deflated by trade 
partners' export prices. Seasonally adjusted. 
World imports 
World total import excl. 
China  Monthly IFS 
In USD, deflated by world import price 
index, seasonally adjusted. 
Demand in 
bilateral ex-
port equations  Real GDP  Quarterly  Bloomberg 
The quarterly data on real GDP in China's 
main export countries was interpolated into 
a monthly data. 
China's do-
mestic demand 
We use industrial production 
as a proxy for domestic de-
mand  Monthly  CEIC  Deflated by CPI, seasonally adjusted. 
REER  Real effective exchange rate  Monthly  IFS  CPI-based measure 
Bilateral RER  Bilateral real exchange rate  Monthly  IFS  CPI-based measure 
Capacity utili-
zation  Estimate for output gap  Monthly    
Business cycles estimated by using 
Hodrick-Prescott filter on industrial produc-
tion data  
Import tariffs 
Weighted average import 




The authors calculated the weighted aver-
age for 2001–2005 with the help of WTO 
tariff data. Data for 1999–2000 was interpo-
lated, as it was not available. 
VAT rebates 
Value-added tax rebates on 
exports Annual  WTO 
The sum of value-added tax returned  to the 
exporters 
FDI 
Accumulation of foreign di-
rect investment into China  Monthly  CEIC 
Original data in USD millions. Converged 
to renminbi and deflated by CPI. Seasonally 
adjusted. 
Bilateral FDI 
Accumulation of bilateral 
direct investment into China  Monthly  CEIC    
   China's import prices  Monthly 
IFS, own cal-
culations 
Index was calculated by taking weights of 
China's 25 most important trading partners 
and their export price indices. 2000=100 
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Table 2  Correlation matrices 
   Ordinary exports  World imports  REER   
Ordinary exports  1         
World imports  0.89 1      
REER  0.04 0.44  1   
       
       
   Processed exports  World imports  REER   
Processed exports  1         
World imports  0.96 1      
REER  0.23 0.44  1   
       
       
   Ordinary imports  Domestic demand  REER  Import tariffs 
Ordinary imports  1         
Domestic demand  0.94  1       
REER  0.07 -0.13  1     
Import tariffs  -0.9 -0.86  -0.31  1 
        
        
  
Imports for proces-
sing  Domestic demand  REER  Import tariffs 
Imports for processing  1         
Domestic demand  0.96  1       
REER  0.1 -0.13  1     
Import tariffs  -0.95 -0.86  -0.31  1 
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Table 3  Augmented Dickey-Fuller test of unit roots 
Series  Det. term  Lagged differences  Test stat. 
Processed exports  constant, trend  4  -0.71 
D_processed exports  constant  2  -10.74*** 
Ordinary exports  constant, trend  2  -1.35 
D_ordinary exports  constant  1  -11.47*** 
Imports for processing  constant, trend  4  -1.49 
D_imports for processing  constant  2  -10.87*** 
Ordinary imports  constant, trend  13  -1.94 
D_ordinary imports  constant  12  -3.54*** 
World imports  constant, trend  8  -2.79 
D_world imports  constant  7  -3.78*** 
Domestic demand  constant, trend  4  0.12 
D_domestic demand  constant  7  -2.23 
REER constant,  trend  1  -2.55 
D_REER constant  0  -8.80*** 
capacity utilization  constant  1  -5.45*** 
D_capacity utilization  constant  3  -8.08*** 
FDI constant  0 -1.99 
D_FDI constant  5  -1.94 
      
* indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level   
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Table 4  Unrestricted cointegration rank test results (Trace test) 
Unrestricted cointegration rank test results (Trace test) for 1994–2005 
                 
Processed exports, REER and world imports       
   λtrace -statistic  10% critical value      
H0: r=0  42.06*  39.76        
H0: r≤1 18.06  23.34         
H0: r≤2 3.55  10.67         
                 
Ordinary exports, REER and world imports      
   λtrace -statistic  10% critical value      
H0: r=0  41.46*  39.76        
H0: r≤1 18.41  23.34         
H0: r≤2 4.24  10.67         
                 
Imports for processing, REER, import tariffs and domestic demand 
   λtrace -statistic  10% critical value      
H0: r=0  71.51***  60.09        
H0: r≤1 36.31  39.76         
H0: r≤2 13.40  23.34         
H0: r≤3 3.95  10.67         
                 
Ordinary imports, REER, import tariffs and domestic demand 
   λtrace -statistic  10% critical value      
H0: r=0  70.93***  60.09        
H0: r≤1 28.79  39.76         
H0: r≤2 15.51  23.34         
H0: r≤3 6.28  10.67         
                 
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level.   
We have used a Johansen cointegration test with the option intercept and trend in CE – no trend in VAR. 
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